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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research is to identify 9/11’s affects on relations between the 
United States and Mexico. In this thesis I examine relevant policy process theories 
that that explain the nature of policy formulated after a crisis. Namely, how policy 
resulting from the reorganization of attention at the national level is used as a causal 
pathway by which policy after 9/11 could impact relations between the two nations. 
Data to support this hypothesis was gathered from congressional hearings before 
and after 9/11. Although the results of this thesis did not fully reject the null 
hypothesis, they do not rule out the thesis being correct if the data was reworked.   
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Introduction 
 
The 20th Century witnessed the creation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), significantly reducing trade barriers and economically 
intertwining the countries involved to an extent that had never been seen before. 
This was followed by the elections of Presidents George Bush and Vicente Fox, who 
not only had good rapport with one another, but also agreed on issues that had 
plagued relations between the two countries for decades. (Santa-Cruz 2012) The 
first year of the Bush and Fox presidency was possibly the peak of relations between the 
two nations. President Bush, previously a border governor representing the state of 
Texas, had strong ties to Mexico and had witnessed firsthand the inefficiencies of 
national policy that did not foster cooperation between the two nations. (U.S.-Mexico 
Binational Council 2000) Hope that relations would continue down this path of 
cooperation and compromise was shattered when terrorists brought down the 
World Trade Center in New York City. Immediately forcing change in the U.S. 
position on issues the two countries had been working to resolve. As 9/11 shifted 
federal and bureaucratic attention away from improving relations and towards anti-
terrorism and homeland security; a policy agenda focused on shared economic and 
other cooperative border reform interests were suddenly redirected to 
strengthened border security.  
How did these attacks affect a seemingly unrelated aspect of U.S. policy, and 
how did policy subsequently affect relations between U.S. and Mexico? Why did 
attacks on New York City by Islamic extremists affect a policy agenda unrelated to 
either, instead focused on increasing cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico? The 
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policy process will be the starting point defining 9/11 as an event that changed 
policy focus. Although they do not adequately explain how policy focus changed 
after 9/11, major policy process theories within political science such as multiple 
streams, advocacy coalition framework, and punctuated equilibrium will be used as 
a foundation for new theories, like policy regimes and policy disruption, which 
better explain the connection. Each is described in the “Literature Review” section of 
this paper. A policy regime explains how an event such as 9/11 can refocus 
attention on a national level towards a unifying policy idea. Policy disruption will be 
a key descriptive factor, as it explains how major events or crises reshuffle a 
national policy agenda that normally has stable and slowly evolving policy goals. 
How policy attention is organized in bureaucracies because of policy disruptions 
and regimes will build on this, followed by how bureaucratic structure shapes the 
implementation of policy after bureaucracies interpret it.  How bureaucracies 
interpret and implement policy handed down from the apex of the federal 
government is used to explain why 9/11 could cause a shift in relations between the 
two nations. Finally, real world examples of disrupted relations between the two 
nations are used to show what the consequences of new policy focused on stopping 
terrorism looks like. 
But what does any of this matter? The federal government is charged by the 
people to plan for and address the uncertainty of the future. This is seen at all levels 
of government, whether it’s Social Security, diplomatic relations with other nations, 
immigration and customs, or investment in infrastructure. Typically decisions that 
affect these plans are made over the course of months or years through stable policy 
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processes. Unfortunately major policy disruptions can quickly change the policy 
process, undermining otherwise stable and incremental policy developments. Policy 
created as a reaction to quick changes tends to be narrowly focused and generally 
only aims to resolve the issue exposed by the disruption. Due to the narrow focus, 
the resulting policy can have unforeseen consequences in subsystems not related to 
the disruption event, challenging the stability policy subsystems are meant to 
enforce. In the constantly evolving world we live in, policy disruption is guaranteed 
to occur over a long enough timeline; a fact long-term policy planning overlooks. 
The results of this thesis may imply that larger questions about the nature of policy 
disruption need to be addressed. How as a nation we might better deal with 
disruption if consideration to what the externalities might be for narrowly focused 
policy. That the “knee jerk” reactions to crisis may symbolically look successful, but 
could be improved if there was some sort of institutional capacity that retained 
stability typically lost to policy disruption. 
The analysis that follows starts with a review of the policy process literature 
that attempts to explain how issues get attention at the national level and in what 
order issues get attention. This is followed by the “Hypothesis” section, which 
formally states the argument for why relations between the U.S. and Mexico 
changed after 9/11. Next is the “Methodology” section; describing how the data was 
gathered and coded along with a description of the statistical tests used. 
“Methodology” is followed by an “Expected Results” and “Results” section. “Expected 
Results” explain why each statistical test was chosen and the models they were 
based on. Also included in this section are arguments for why each test would prove 
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or disprove the hypothesis they are based on. The “Results” section describes the 
findings of this paper and if they prove or disprove the null hypothesis.  
Literature Review 
The primary, and most fundamental, literature this thesis will rely on is that 
which explains policy processes. The policy process will be used to draw 
connections linking 9/11 to a setback in relations between the United States and 
Mexico. The idea behind this is a large-scale policy redefinition can determine the 
fundamental direction of public policy for decades, and this shift in direction can 
have unforeseen consequences. When specifically related to this project it theorizes 
that 9/11 was a big enough policy disruption to setback and redefine the relations 
between the U.S. and Mexico through various policy channels.  
Academic literature regarding the policy process is extensive, with many 
theories competing to explain how policy is formed, influences on policymakers, 
effects of policy, how agendas are affected by policy, etc. Identifying what theories 
best explain policy resulting from 9/11 is the first step for relating this event to 
changing relations between the U.S. and Mexico. The work of Matthew Nowlin and 
José Real-Dato outline the strengths and weaknesses of multiple Stream, punctuated 
equilibrium and advocacy coalition framework. Real-Dato’s article takes this a step 
further by proposing a synthetic explanatory framework aimed at combining the 
three theories so that weaknesses in one theory are compensated by the other two.  
Multiple steams (MS) theory of policy process states that there are three 
separate and independent steams that influence policy making: the problem stream, 
the politics stream, and the policy stream. Policy change occurs when a policy 
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entrepreneur1 combines all three streams, coupling an idea from the policy stream 
to an issue in the problem stream at a time when coupling the two will work with 
the political stream. (Nowlin 2011, 44-45; Kingdon 1984, 188) Immediately a 
problem arises with the assumption that streams are separate when applied to 
policy after 9/11. Multiple steams argues that involvement in one steam limits 
involvement in the other two streams. However, Robertson and Eller in their work 
on participation in school violence prevention provide examples of individuals and 
organizations that participate in both the problem stream and policy stream. 
(Nowlin 2011, 45) In order to compensate for this problem the policy regime theory 
has been advocated, which will be discussed in detail later.  
Additional weaknesses in MS start with overlooking micro level processes. 
(Real-Dato 2009, 119) How institutional factors can effect actor’s decisions on 
policy is not sufficiently explained under MS. (Real-Dato 2009, 119) This thesis’s 
focus on institutions and MS’s underestimation of their importance, causes MS to 
not be an ideal fit when explaining institutional changes after 9/11. The importance 
MS places on environmental factors, aka outside influences on political stream, but 
not boundary relationships creates another issue. Boundary relationships are 
“relationships between policy subsystems and their environment, and particularly 
the mechanisms through which causal influences traverse subsystem boundaries 
both inwards and outwards.” (Real-Dato 2009, 120)  Applied, this criticizes the 
assumption that policy entrepreneurs are static, waiting for an opportunity within 
                                                        
1 Policy entrepreneurs are advocates who invest their resources to promote a 
position in return for future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary 
benefits.  
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their boundaries and not considering subsystems2 outside their boundaries. (Real-
Dato 2009, 120) This leads into the final problem with MS, its limited explanatory 
scope. MS favors environmental factors outside of the policy system to explain 
policy change and by favoring one causal path of policy change; it overlooks other 
paths that may cause policy change. (Real-Dato 2009, 120-121) 
Punctuated equilibrium (PE) deals with two aspects of policymaking, long 
periods of stasis and rapid policy change.  PE research treats information as 
“signals”, these signals go through information processing or “collecting, assembling, 
interpreting, and prioritizing those signals” (Nowlin 2011, 49-50) Information 
processing assumes groups or individuals use selective attention and attention-
driven choice to interpret signals. Selective attention means individuals are limited 
mentally in their ability to process all available information and attention-driven 
choice states individuals “ignore or overreact to the information signals from their 
surroundings”. (Nowlin 2011, 50) Both cause policy outcomes depending on how 
individuals setting policy, process the information. Building on selective attention 
and information processing, Daniel Nohrstedt cites literature explaining how actors 
within subsystems respond to signals. Actors are more likely to choose signals 
compatible with their existing belief systems and ignore signals that challenge it. 
(Nohrstedt 2010, 9) The U.S. government typically faces an oversupply of 
information, major events like 9/11 compound the problem due to the amount of 
attention it receives and subsequent information generated. This forces a group like 
Congress, through attention-driven choice, to prioritize information and delegate 
                                                        
2 Subsystems are established coalitions of interests whose participants advance 
ideas or problem definitions about a particular set of issues.  
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information processing to the bureaucracy. (Nowlin 2011, 50) Delegation of 
information processing can have some unforeseen consequences that will be 
discussed in the section on how the bureaucracy responds to policy disruption.  
Like MS, PE does not sufficiently explain micro level processes like 
institutional affects on individuals (Real-Dato 2009, 119) However, PE checks its 
own weakness when dealing with institutions, literature calling for a more in-depth 
examination with recent articles attempting to rectify this. (Real-Dato 2009, 120) PE 
also has a better grip on boundary relationships than MS, as PE advocates conflict 
expansion outside subsystems boundaries as cause for policy change, which is 
further explained with policy regimes. (Real-Dato 2009, 119) PE also suffers from its 
limited explanatory scope and problem of the explanandum. Like MS, PE’s limited 
explanatory scope involves the theories tendency to favor one causal path for policy 
change, namely emphasis on policy entrepreneur’s strategic behavior. (Real-Dato 
2009, 121) The problem of the explanandum reveals the real world affect policy 
change has, or what changes when policy changes. Here PE shares another problem 
with MS, in that it looks at the number of regulations passed or budget allocations as 
measures of successful policy adoption. (Real-Dato 2009, 121) This overlooks what 
changes occur in the bureaucracy with policy adoption, a major point in this thesis.   
Before moving onto Advocacy Coalition Framework, further explanation of 
signals and stimuli are needed along with how the federal government chooses 
information. Signals are important because they let society direct the government 
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and let the government direct society.3  (Rose 1989, 234 & 237) In terms of the 
policy process, signals are amplified when involved with policy that produces a 
large change in society or government. (Rose 1989, 239) Experts are considered 
crucial to how the government interprets signals from society. Notably, experts are 
crucial in problem identification and awareness, and deciding what the appropriate 
policy response is. (Rose 1989, 238). Richard Rose concludes that signals coming 
from laws or expert opinions have a greater impact and importance than signals 
from society. (Rose 1989, 239) Coupled with signals is how the federal government 
produces official information that steers policy discussion. Just as experts are 
important for interpreting signals from society, expertise is also important to the 
production of information that influences policy attention and discussion. Elizabeth 
Jagger states “knowledge is not objective or neutral, but always related to 
power…and how this relates to “truths” being produced.” (Jagger 1997, 447) This 
means information is seen as irrelevant or illegitimate if not presented by a 
qualified and authorized speaker, whose aim is to promote a shared understanding 
with individuals the speaker is addressing. (Jagger 1997, 447-448) Policy is more 
likely to incorporate expert knowledge, if said knowledge fits into policymakers 
existing belief structure. (Jagger 1997, 446) This makes information hierarchically 
categorized by government, with information seen as more legitimate than other 
information depending on how it fits into belief structures. (Jagger 1997, 448) 
                                                        
3 Signals to the government from society are in the form of votes, street 
demonstrations or private lobbying. The government sends signals back by enacting 
laws and other policy that tell society what it should and shouldn’t do.  
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Advocacy coalition framework (ACF) focuses on policy learning and policy 
change within a subsystem, explaining policy change as a result of policy learning4 
and external or internal shocks5 to a subsystem. (Nowlin 2011, 46; Real-Dato 2009, 
127). Applied to subsystems involved in the aftermath of 9/11, external shocks of 
crisis and public opinion will be the foci. Also useful is ACF’s distinction between 
major and minor policy change. Change in core policy for governmental programs is 
major and a change in secondary aspects of the same programs is minor. (Nohrstedt 
2010, 7) ACF also explains how shared core beliefs translate into homogeneous 
advocacy coalitions, which have better patterns of policy coordination and are 
stable over time. (Nowlin 2011, 46) This is similar to the idea government will 
categorize information as more important if it fits into existing belief structures. It 
should be noted ACF does not face the same pitfalls as MS and PE, but still has one 
major drawback. ACF focuses on policy change and stability over a longer time 
period, about ten or more years. (Real-Dato 2009, 118-119) Changes after 9/11 
happened rapidly, within the span of a year or two, making the ACF framework less 
than ideal for this thesis.  
Daniel Nohrstedt helps fix the aforementioned problem with ACF, using crisis 
as his measure of external shock. Characteristics of a crisis he defines are “surprise, 
threat to core societal values, uncertainty, and urgency regarding important 
decisions” that result in periods of “disorder in the seemingly normal development 
                                                        
4 Policy learning refers to the production of knowledge oriented towards a better 
understanding, or redefinition, of the relationship between policy design and their 
consequences.  
5 External and internal shocks can be change in public opinion, changes in governing 
coalitions, outputs from other subsystems, and focusing events.  
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of a system and wide-spread questioning or discrediting of established policies, 
practices, and institutions” (Nohrstedt 2010, 5) Crisis fitting this definition is 
expected to cause the following reactions. Significant managerial challenges arising 
because of the symbolic challenges to governmental power the crisis creates. This 
challenge comes from the crisis discrediting the existing political order. (Nohrstedt 
2010, 5-6) Nohrstedt also helps us further define subsystems, with additional help 
coming from Peter May. Subsystems contain an unlimited number of components 
(institutions, actors, issues, etc.) that interact to produce outputs for policy. Actor’s 
integration into a subsystem can make them autonomous from other subsystems. 
Each subsystem must have a degree of authority in order to produce policy 
outcomes. Subsystems structure political conflict by limiting entrants and debate 
through established patterns of policymaking that are occasionally punctuated by 
major disruptions. (Nohrstedt 2010, 7-8; Jochim & May 2010, 308) Basically 
subsystems function to bring stability to an otherwise volatile process.  
There are three causal mechanisms that link crisis to major policy change. 
First is a redistribution of political resources, such as financial resources, public 
opinion, access to authority, mobilizable supporters, skillful leadership, and 
scientific and technical information. (Nohrstedt 2010, 11) A visible crisis focuses 
attention on problems and potential solutions, giving policy entrepreneurs and 
actors within subsystems access to new political resources. (Nohrstedt 2010, 11) 
The second causal mechanism is exploitation of crisis by a policy entrepreneurs and 
minorities seeking change, waiting for policy opportunities that can cause change in 
accordance with their belief system. (Nohrstedt 2010, 11) Lastly, how the crisis 
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makes members of the dominant coalition reconsider existing beliefs through crisis-
induced learning, the event causing reassessment of policy beliefs. (Nohrstedt 2010, 
11 & 18) Rarely will a crisis introduce new problems, but amplify a pre-existing one. 
(Nohrstedt 2010, 17) The combination of this idea with the causal mechanisms 
linking crisis to policy change explains why many counterterrorism policy changes 
implemented after 9/11 were already on the intelligence policy agenda. (Nohrstedt 
2010, 17) 
Building on all the three theories, and using Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD)6 as a foundation; José Real-Dato proposes a synthetic 
explanatory framework. Important elements of this not taken into account by other 
policy process theories are as follows. Participants within a subsystem that 
influence policy do so on an institutional or design level. At the institutional level are 
individuals responsible for making day-to-day decisions based on national policy 
within a subsystem. The design level involves two types of participants, public 
policymakers who hand down policy to the institutional level, and insiders who 
have access and some degree of influence over the policymakers. (Real-Dato 2009, 
122) This all occurs in the action arena, defined as the social space where all 
individuals interact. The action arena is outlined by boundary relationships that 
incorporate all relevant action arenas into a single subsystem. (Real-Dato 2009, 
123) Real-Dato attributes policy stability to the decisional core of a subsystem being 
isolated from the influence of other subsystems. (Real-Dato 2009, 124) Policy is 
more stable because hierarchical institutional design isolates the decisional core of a 
                                                        
6 IAD is a theory of policy process focusing on how institutional arrangements 
influence policy. 
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subsystem and connects policy to accepted social norms and political values, making 
potential deviations from policy difficult. (Real-Dato 2009, 125) Stable policy is also 
the result of a subsystem seeing similar situations repeat themselves over time, but 
situations cannot be excessively complex for this to hold true. (Real-Dato 2009, 129)  
The final aspect of a synthetic explanatory framework, conflict expansion, 
leads into policy regimes. This connects policy regimes to the synthetic explanatory 
framework, and by extension MS, PE and ACF. Conflict expansion turns isolated 
subsystems into connected ones, through image redefinition.7 (Real-Dato 2009, 131-
133) The theory of policy regimes explain connected subsystems, attempting to 
describe the narrow view policymakers have when addressing policy issues that 
span multiple subsystems. (Jochim & May 2010, 306) The fundamental idea behind 
policy regimes is major issues can have trans-subsystem change among linked 
subsystems, linked by overlapping issues and interests. Subsystems are joined by 
events such as 9/11, defined later as a policy disruption event (Jochim & May 2010, 
306; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 286) Russell Williams follows this to its 
extreme, theorizing policy spillovers can create an entirely new subsystem with new 
institutions and actors. (Williams 2009, 34) Peter May argues a more moderate 
theory suggesting boundary spanning policy regimes are the end product of 
multiple individuals within multiple subsystems working towards a similar policy 
goal. (Jochim & May 2010, 307) Pressure to work towards a similar policy goal 
comes from centralized authority focused on resolving a single issue; resolved by 
                                                        
7 Image redefinition is change that attracts individuals attention by redefining the 
policy issue, incentivizing actors to “do the right thing”, which is decided by social 
norms 
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governing arrangements that foster integrative policy and effective action among 
subsystems. (Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 286; Jochim & May 2010, 307)  
Therefore policy regimes are “governing arrangements that span multiple 
subsystems”, governing arrangements attempting to use elements from each 
relevant subsystems to bring stability and cohesion to the policy regime. (Jochim & 
May 2011, 308)  
A policy regime is made up of four facets: ideas, issues, interests, and 
institutions. Ideas serve to create a set of common policy purposes that key players 
in separate subsystems can act upon. (Jochim & May 2011, 312) The commonality of 
ideas sets a course for the direction of governing arrangements, organizing policy 
and action. (Jochim & May 2011, 312) Issues focus attention of individuals and 
subsystems, and in this way act to integrate related subsystems. Widespread crisis 
or problems expose the issue to a broad range of individuals, creating the demand 
for policy solutions. (Jochim & May 2011, 311; Kettl 2003, 257) How different 
interests involve themselves determines the level of consensus or conflict the policy 
regime will face. (Jochim & May 2011, 312) Interests lend strength to a policy 
regime, but must be realigned in the same direction to strengthen a policy regime. 
(Jochim & May 2011, 312) Institutions, congressional committees, and government 
agencies, are central to informational flow and policymaking; a crucial integrative 
force for subsystems and the uptake of ideas (Jochim & May 2011, 313) The degree 
that institutions can foster policy cohesion relies on institutions unifying under 
subsystems. Examples of this are a policy czar, dominant congressional committee, 
or agency with authority concentrated at the apex (Jochim & May 2011, 313) 
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May follows his discussion on policy regimes with six examples that fit the 
criteria for a regime. One regime acknowledged is homeland security, which 
becomes the focus of his second article. Homeland security is a crisis-driven regime; 
meaning widespread attention makes the issue seem more urgent and forces 
policymakers to act quickly (Jochim & May 2011, 316) Each regime is compared in 
terms of strength and durability8. (Jochim & May 2011, 317 & 320) Strength of a 
regime is a function of the four facets that create a regime discussed above. Using 
this framework to analyze homeland security, May finds the regime to be weak. 
Weakness starts with the idea behind homeland security, “protecting the 
homeland”. The idea suffers from multiple definitions by political leaders and does 
not attract attention well, shown by the fact it was not widely embraced by key 
individuals within the regime. (Jochim & May 2011, 318) The regime also suffers 
from lack of interest support, with a large mobilization of interests directly 
following the attack but fading support as the crisis passed. (Jochim & May 2011, 
319; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 291) Additionally, although the institution of 
homeland security is highly centralized in the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the institution faces intense bureaucratic competition that hampers its 
strength. (Jochim & May 2011, 319; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 288) The 
factors that contribute to the regimes weakness also cause the regime to produce 
unstable policy. However, homeland security does have a redeeming factor due to 
                                                        
8 Strength is the ability of a given regime to bring about the integration of elements 
of relevant subsystems and to reduce policy fragmentation with respect to a 
particular messy problem. Durability is the regimes ability to stay connected over 
time.  
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the fact that regime strength does not necessarily translate into regime durability. 
The issue that underscores the homeland security regime is highly salient and 
difficult to displace due to continued concerns about terrorism, making the regime 
to be highly durable. (Jochim & May 2011, 320) Therefore it can be concluded the 
homeland security regime produces unstable policy over a long period of time.  
In order to create a policy regime, first there must be a policy disruption 
event. Policy is redefined by disruptions through the disruptions introduction of 
new ideas or attributes to a problem. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 171) 
Disruptions have three effects on subsystems. The first being refocused attention of 
policymakers to the disruption, also discussed in the section on a synthetic 
explanatory framework, signals, and production of information. (May, Sapotichne & 
Workman 2009, 189-190) In relation to 9/11 this looks at attention given to 
terrorism prior to, and after the disruption. The second part examines policymakers 
refocused attention and its effect on policy making. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 
2009, 189-190) This sheds light on how increased attention causes a shift in policy 
making. Finally, the effect of the disruption itself coupled with policymakers 
response and what this translates into for federal agencies. (May, Sapotichne & 
Workman 2009, 189-190) In regards to anti-terrorism it would mean what level of 
importance terrorism was for specific federal agencies before and after 9/11.   
 Major disruptions have a typical response of centralizing government efforts 
in order to regain control and stability lost in the disruption. (May, Sapotichne & 
Workman 2009, 174) An example of this would be the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security and the many agencies it absorbed. This has the effect of 
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redirecting multiple priorities of multiple agencies towards a central goal. 
Redirection of priorities could conceivably cause issues unrelated to the disruption 
to also be redirected to reflect a central goal. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 
174) Therefore relations between the U.S. and Mexico could possibly be affected 
because of centralized organization and its results on various subsystems. How 
much subsystems are affected can be measured by system engagement, or the 
degree to which policymakers take on the issue through hearings and laws. (May, 
Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 176) 
 Policy disruption and its effects on national agendas is only one piece of the 
puzzle. Understanding how disruption events reverberate in the bureaucracy is 
equally important. Crisis makes policymakers grapple with the events implications 
and the issues exposed by attempting to create policy that will regain stability. 
Typically this policy tells bureaucratic agencies to “do things better” or “do things 
differently”, which by definition is disruptive to those agencies existing agenda. 
(May, Workman & Jones 2007, 517) How agencies organizational attention is 
changed because of policy demands is crucial to understanding the full impact of 
implementing new centralized policy.  
Bureaucratic structures have two ways of organizing information; the first is 
delegation of authority and use of formal routines and the second is centralized 
authority and the use of informal procedures. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 518) 
The first is a prototypical response of a bureaucracy, “incorporating policy signals 
into existing information channels, involving delegation of tasks to expertise at 
lower levels of the organization, and invoking existing routines for bureaucratic 
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policymaking.” (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 521) The second way of organizing 
information is used when policymakers’ demands require substantial change, like 
what is required after a disruption event. The highest levels of the government 
attend to policy; leaders retaining decision-making power and creating new ways to 
process information. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 521) Channeling policy change 
through delegation of authority and formal routines lessens policy signals and slows 
organizational response whereas policy change through centralization and informal 
procedures quickly pushes attention and energy towards the policy goals. (May, 
Workman & Jones 2007, 522) A bureaucracy processing new policy through existing 
channels may slow response, but also creates more stable policy implementation. In 
contrast centralized authority makes a bureaucracy very responsive to the demands 
of a leader and flexible in its operations, but at the cost of stable policy 
implementation. The policy following 9/11 is an example of centralized authority, as 
the Bush administration was very successful in focusing agencies towards an 
antiterrorism agenda.  (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 519) 
 Since organizational structure organizes information, it is not unreasonable 
to think by extinction it also organizes attention because “the structure influences 
which options are to be compared, in what sequence, and by whom” (May, 
Workman & Jones 2007, 520) How attention is focused is indicated by centralized 
authority handing down information, or guidance as a means to direct an agency. 
Guidance manifests itself in agency-generated policy statements and grant program 
guidelines, both of which are not legally binding in the way formal rules are. (May, 
Workman & Jones 2007, 524) Since guidance is not legally binding it gives the 
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agency flexibility when addressing issues and channeling attention. However this 
flexibility cannot be achieved without significantly disrupting any ongoing tasks 
within the organization and taking away the organizations ability to deal with 
multiple issues at once. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 523) Another indication of 
centralized authority focusing agencies attention is the amount leaders of federal 
agencies reinforce agenda items when speaking to audiences or at congressional 
hearings, using the issue at hand as their focal point. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 
525)  
 Attention focused on anti-terrorism has unintended consequences, as little 
attention and resources are left for programs unrelated to terrorism that now found 
themselves under the DHS. Since most funds were appropriated for anti-terrorism, 
agencies that did not have this as part of their agenda were forced to change 
programs focus in order to receive funding. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 535) 
State and local governments were also frustrated by the uncertainty of DOH grant 
programs, causing an unstable relationship. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 536) 
Another consequence of the attention shift was an inability to align with stable 
congressional principles, as agencies found themselves in an environment defined 
by unstable policy. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 536) The combination of unstable 
policy and budgets may cause distrust amongst individuals in different bureaucratic 
agencies, hampering working relationships centered on new policy. Abdulkareem 
Abdulrazaq Kayode’s work provides insight to how the bureaucracy can affect 
foreign relations. The most relevant point is that the bureaucracy is important to the 
governments ability to handle multiple issues at once, with each bureau or agency 
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assigned certain roles. (Kayode 2008, 7) Bureaucracies are influential in terms of 
foreign relaitons because not only do they execute and implement policy, but are 
also indirect policy makers. They may not directly create policy, but their 
importance cannot be overlooked for interpretations of said policy though drafting 
memoranda, preparing policy agendas, negotiating funds, and working out 
priorities.  (Kayode 2008, 7) 
 The subsystem most important to the thesis will be border protection. 
Border protection will be a crucial aspect because it is where relations between the 
two nations begin and end. (Andres 2005, 1) This means relations between the two 
nations almost always involves the border in some capacity. Therefore the book 
Inevitable Partnership provides an excellent starting point. Part I outlines the history 
of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Mexico through 2000. Throughout this 
history, issues such as immigration, trade, and drug trafficking are major focal 
points. (Smith 2000, 59-87; Smith 2000, 117-143) It also touches on the difference 
in rhetoric towards the U.S. from Mexico by different presidents and vice versa from 
the 1970s to early 2000. The pattern of language that emerges is one reflecting 
increased cooperation, starting with President George H.W. Bush and Salinas, and 
continuing with President Clinton and Zedillo. (Smith 2000, 59-87; Smith 2000, 89-
100) Since the book was published before the terrorist attacks, it is optimistic for 
continually improving relations between the two nations, providing insight to the 
trajectory relations were on before 9/11.  
 Like Inevitable Partnership, the report from the U.S.-Mexico Binational 
Counsel is published the year before the events of 9/11 and outlines specific policy 
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recommendations for President Bush and Fox. Although recommendations rarely 
translate directly into laws, the report suggests the direction relations were headed 
between the U.S. and Mexico before 9/11. Recommendations include: an open 
border much like the one between the U.S. and Canada, direct phone lines between 
governors on opposite sides of the border, and more communication between the 
U.S. Congress and its Mexican counterpart. (U.S.-Mexico Binational Council 2000, x-
xv) 
 The Center for Comparison Immigration Studies provides literature looking 
into border controls pre- and post-9/11. This notes how traditional border issues 
such as trade and migration were handled before 9/11, with major security 
concerns focused on illegal immigration and drug trafficking, not terrorism. (Andres 
2003, 2-4) NAFTA had begun opening up the border in order to increase trade flows, 
economic prosperity trumping security concerns. (Andres 2003, 4) The attacks that 
followed made it impossible to view traditional border issues without a national 
security lens. Viewing the border through a national security lens shifts attention 
away from economic issues towards securing the border, creating paradox for 
NAFTA policies that encouraged a borderless economy. (Andres 2003, 3) Providing 
insight to how the subsystem of border security felt policy disruption and 
bureaucratic policy responses.  
 The Management of Border Security in NAFTA is a similar article detailing 
changes in border security after 9/11. It differs by comparing the U.S. border 
relationship with Canada and Mexico. The explanation for our more open border 
with Canada after 9/11 is twofold. First, economic interests with Canada have 
  
 23 
outbalanced the threats. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 6) The second part involves the 
application of image theory, in this case how nations perceive each other. American 
policymakers see Canada as an ally, a nation of cultural and political equals with 
similar values. On the other hand Mexico is viewed through a colonial image, or a 
nation of incompetent people who need direction from a superior perceiver. 
(Cottam & Marenin 2005, 12) The latter part of this explains why policy set by the 
U.S. affecting Mexico leaves little room for autonomous policy choices by Mexican 
authorities. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 14) This could mean changes in policy by the 
U.S. may have pronounced consequences in terms of relations. The article also 
examines the track record for cooperation with drug enforcement issues between 
the nations. On the U.S. side of the border 50 different agencies are in some way 
responsible for drug-related policing. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 20) Although 
connected through the DEA, the number of agencies causes problems in regards to 
what needs to be done, who has authority, and how to share resources. This leads to 
limited cooperation with Mexican authorities. (Cottam & Marenin 2005, 20) 
 Finally the books Two Nations Indivisible and Mexico-United States Relations, 
The Semantics of Sovereignty describe changes seen in policy and relations between 
the two nations after 9/11. Presidents Bush and Fox are described as, “both ranch-
loving former border governors” who got along well. (O’Neil 2013, 71) However, 
this cooperation became another victim in the terrorist attacks; the focal point of 
cooperation, immigration policy, becoming another tool to combat terrorism. 
(O’Neil 2013, 71) Since the attacks reshaped the U.S. view of immigration; foreign 
policy focused on fighting terrorism reduced the agenda importance of increasing 
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cooperation with Mexico. Causing the U.S. to offer no compromises in new 
immigration policy that followed 9/11. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 115-116) This conduct by 
the U.S. following 9/11 was unpopular with Mexican citizens and government 
officials. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 157) 9/11 also caused the largest bureaucratic 
restructuring of the U.S. intelligence and military communities. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 
100) The military side of this restructuring was seen in a new combatant command9 
established by the Pentagon; Mexican military leadership disliking the idea of 
working through a combatant command instead of dealing directly with the 
Secretary of Defense or chiefs of staff. (Santa-Cruz 2012, 100) 
Hypothesis 
Policy demands after a disruption like 9/11 create unstable policy that is 
difficult for bureaucracies to respond to. No longer part of an isolated subsystem, 
they are incorporated into a policy regime that has a different set of narrowly 
focused policy goals. New policy goals are quickly pushed into the bureaucracy 
through centralization that refocuses bureaucratic attention to reflect refocused 
national attention. Centralization disrupts agency agendas that are based on long-
term planning and delegation of problems to different parts of the bureaucracy, 
causing policy instability. Long-term planning is stable because stability is gained 
from policy learning through repeated events that are not overly complex and 
isolation of bureaucratic structures from outside influence. 9/11 represents not 
only a new event, but also one that introduces extremely complex issues. 
Bureaucracies involved in addressing and maintaining the United States 
                                                        
9 U.S. Northern Command, responsible for military action in Canada, part of the 
Caribbean, and Mexico.  
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relationship with Mexico, like the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection, use policy learning to created long-term policy 
goals through formal routines, reflecting the long-term policy signals from the 
federal government. After 9/11 both were incorporated into a policy regime focused 
on homeland security, meaning issues such as immigration and customs were now 
analyzed within the context of homeland security. Any long-term planning involving 
Mexico would be crowded out by the new organizational structure focused on 
homeland security, destabilizing policy affecting Mexico. Previously stable 
bureaucratic policy towards Mexico becoming destabilized and results of this, can 
be summed up by, “talk of mutual prosperity fell victim to a U.S. obsession with 
border security.” (O’Neil 2013, 71) This hypothesis attempts to explain why a 
change in relations between the U.S. and Mexico occurred, outlined at the end of the 
“Literature Review” section. 
Methodology  
 Data for this study was collected from the online archives of the U.S. 
Government Printing Office. The data itself was gathered from all available Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearings from the 106th and 108th Congresses; closed 
hearings are omitted because they are not available to the public. Congressional 
hearings were chosen because they convey the strongest signals from policymakers 
to the bureaucracy, including signals from the interpretation of existing laws, the 
views of experts, and positions of key elected officials. The 106th Senate hearings 
were chosen because these took place during the last full congressional session 
before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Hearings of the 108th Congress were selected 
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because these were scheduled in the first full session after the attacks and the 
organization of the Department of Homeland Security. Additionally, the 108th 
Congress is a full year after the attacks, which decreases the amount of “knee jerk” 
legislation presented and symbolic hearings produced in response to the attacks. 
The data set includes 86 Senate hearings from the 106th Congress and 108 
Senate hearings from the 108th Congress. This brings the total number of hearings 
included in the data gathered to 194, each coded separately for the words terrorism 
and Mexico. Documents included in the hearings official record are counted as part 
of that hearings discourse. Words coded in these documents are attributed to the 
individual who submitted them into the hearing record. Words are not counted if 
part of an individual’s or document’s title because the words in titles are typically 
repeated during the individual’s introductory statement or in the documents 
submission in the hearing. Doing so enhances the statistical data by avoiding a 
single word being counted twice. The word was counted if part of a footnote, but not 
if it is part of a citation. Footnotes add depth to the document by further explaining 
rhetoric in a document, where citations do not. Variations of each word are also 
counted: such as anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, terrorist, narco-terrorism, etc. 
Similarly, Mexican was counted as an acceptable variation of Mexico in order to 
count when individuals mentioned Mexicans, the Mexican government, and Mexican 
military. The words terror and terrorize are omitted because their use did not 
always mean terrorism was the foci of that sentence. Mexico was not counted when 
it referred to the Gulf of Mexico or New Mexico.  
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Coding the data involved counting the number of times each word is used in 
a hearing and by whom each word is used. An individual’s use of the word is coded 
into eleven categories initially, and condensed into four: elected officials, department 
heads, lower level department officials, and experts. Elected officials are a 
combination of Senators and Members of the House. Staff members writing on 
behalf of the elected official is coded as the official. In addition to department 
secretaries, heads of independent government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for 
International Development are also included in the department heads category. A 
full list of independent agencies coded this way is available in Appendix A. General 
statements from a department not attributed to an individual are coded under the 
department heads variable. Military commanders at the head of a military branch or 
in charge of a theater/region are also coded under department head in the 
condensed categories. Lower level department officials are defined as anyone 
working under the department secretary such as assistant secretaries, under 
secretaries, and deputy secretaries. Experts are considered to be anyone who fell 
outside of the previous three categories and included: representatives from Non-
Governmental Organizations, academics, representatives from a company, former 
government employees, and in some cases U.S. ambassadors. Each was considered 
to be an expert because of their capacity at the hearing; their purpose was to 
provide the hearing with expertise on the issue under discussion.  
Hearings are also coded by focus and what subcommittee they appeared 
before. A hearings focus was determined by reading the opening statement of the 
presiding Senator, in which they outline topics that will be covered in that specific 
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hearing. Coding for focus was done very specifically, resulting in 62 categories, then 
reduced to twelve broad categories: bureaucracy, specific region or country, 
international organization, human rights, national security, trade/economics, conflict, 
foreign relations, justice/crime, terrorism, aid, and Middle East. Hearings can have 
multiple focuses, as it helps regains some of the specificity lost from reducing the 
number focus categories. As previously noted, hearings are also coded by 
subcommittee. The eight possible subcommittees presiding over each hearing are 
listed at the beginning of every hearings record. These are: African Affairs; East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs; European Affairs; International Economic Policy, Export, and 
Trade Promotion; International Operations; Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; and 
Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism. It is important to note in 
the 108th Congress International Operations becomes International Operations and 
Terrorism; while Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics, and Terrorism 
becomes Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps and Narcotics. A full explanation of all the 
variables listed in the previous paragraphs can be found in Appendix A.  
The question being tested in this analysis focuses on the effects of disruption 
on policy agendas. Hearings before Congress allow agencies to present their plans, 
and also allow members of Congress to discuss their own agendas. In general, we 
expect agency agendas to reflect long-term planning. What effect does a sudden and 
unexpected event such as 9/11 have on policy agendas? Do the various actors in the 
agenda-setting environment return to the same issues following the disruption, or 
does the disruption create a realignment of the agenda itself? The independent 
variable for the statistical test is 9/11, the disruption, coded depending on if the 
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hearing was before or after the attack. The primary dependent variable is change in 
the number of time each word-Mexico and terrorism-was used. The secondary 
dependent variable is number of times different individuals use each word, while 
the control variables are hearing focus and subcommittee. From this two-sample t-
tests10 are run to determine the correlation between each word before the 
disruption (the independent variable 9/11), then compared to the correlation 
between each word after the disruption. This test is run again to determine the 
correlation for individual’s use of each word before and after the disruption. The 
two-sample t-test is also reworked to determine hearing attendance for department 
heads before and after the disruption. With this, two separate ordered logistic 
regressions11 are run with the addition of two other independent variables: hearing 
focus and subcommittee. This regression will determine how use of each word 
changes depending on the focus of the committee or subcommittee the hearing is 
before.  
Expected Results.  
Measuring the unintended consequences of expansive federal policy is a 
difficult task to undertake. A policy’s success or failure is typically measured by the 
results it is expected to produce, in our case, keeping the public safe from additional 
terrorist attacks. Connecting policy to results it was not expected to produce is a 
difficult phenomenon to quantitatively observe. In attempting to alleviate this, data 
                                                        
10 T-test shows the difference between means of two random samples of 
independent observations. Results determine how probable it is the two samples 
correlation is not due to random chance. 
11 Ordered logistic regression is used to predict the outcome of an ordinal 
dependant variable with two or more independent variables.  
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and methods used were modeled on data and methods run by Peter May in his 
articles examining policy disruption, policy regimes, and responses of the 
bureaucracy to agenda disruption. Each of which is also difficult to measure 
quantitatively. It should be recognized that the data collected for this thesis is not as 
extensive as the data it is modeled after, however in the interest of time and 
manpower this was the only option. May’s work on policy disruptions is where the 
idea to gather data from congressional hearings originates, along with coding those 
hearings by focus. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 180) The literature 
constructing policy regimes also uses Congressional hearings as a data set. However, 
this analysis differs from the policy disruption data by coding the involvement of 
different actors at hearings and measuring ideational uptake12 of core ideas to the 
policy regime. (Jochim & May 2011, 317; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 293)  The 
first tests modeled on this looks at changes in elected officials, department heads, 
lower level department officials and experts use of each word. The second tests, 
measuring ideational uptake, looks for consistent use of the word terrorism 
regardless of hearing focus. Consistent use of the term terrorism regardless of 
hearing focus or presiding subcommittee would show ideational uptake across 
multiple subsystems. Finally, in responses of the bureaucracy to agenda disruption, 
May again uses hearings and codes for actors. What differs is his attention to heads 
of federal agencies, coding their attendance and rhetoric at hearings. (May, 
                                                        
12 Ideational uptake reflects the extent to which actors in different subsystems 
embrace the ideas, interests, and institutions that serve to contribute to the 
formation and strength of a policy regime.   
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Workman & Jones 2007, 524-525 & 534) This is the foundation behind counting 
department heads use of each word and binomially coding their attendance.  
If this thesis is correct, running statistical tests on the data collected should 
produce results that demonstrate a strong negative correlation between the words 
Mexico and terrorism. This correlation is fundamental in supporting the hypothesis 
that 9/11 caused a disruption in the relations between the U.S. and Mexico. A 
negative correlation would show increased use of terrorism and decreased use of 
Mexico. Increased use of terrorism is expected and important for the following 
reasons. To start, a policy disruption event refocuses the attention of individuals, 
namely policymakers, to the issue it exposes. (May, Sapotichne & Workman 2009, 
172-173) Using data from congressional hearings shows not only increased 
attention to the issue, but system engagement13 as well. (May, Sapotichne & 
Workman 2009, 176) This points to issue redefinition of terrorism, and therefore 
conflict expansion of terrorism into multiple subsystems. (Real-Dato 2009, 131-
133)  
Expansion into multiple subsystems leads to the policy disruption being 
significant enough to create the foundations for a policy regime. Statistical tests that 
would support terrorism creating a homeland security policy regime are two-
sample t-tests that track changes in individuals use of the term terrorism and 
ordered logistic regressions looking at consistent use of this term regardless of 
hearing focus or subcommittee. The t-tests would show homeland security 
emerging as a crisis driven regime, creating consensus among individuals at the 
                                                        
13 System engagement is defined as the degree to which policymakers grapple with 
issues by holding hearings or passing laws than simply making pronouncements.  
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federal level about a central policy problem. (Jochim & May 2011, 312 & 316) On the 
other hand, regressions would support homeland securities ideational uptake as an 
issue now relevant to multiple subsystems. Ideas behind the homeland security 
regime serve to create common policy goals that actors in separate subsystems can 
act on. (Jochim & May 2011, 312; Jochim, May & Sapotichne 2011, 293)  
The real world effects of an emerging crisis driven policy regime can be 
witnessed with the redistribution of political resources and centralization of 
government efforts to regain control and stability lost by the event, seen in the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (May, Sapotichne & 
Workman 2009, 174; Nohrstedt 2010, 11) Creation of the DHS is the largest federal 
government restructuring since the Department of Defense was created in 1947, 
and most complicated federal reorganization in U.S. history, combining 22 federal 
agencies with 165,000 employees. (Kettl 2003, 259) Issue redefinition caused 
agencies previously seen as unrelated to homeland security or terrorism, to be 
reorganized under the DHS. Reorganization caused the DHS to be involved in the 
following subsystems: information security, food safety, border security, 
transportation safety, technological hazards, public health emergences, domestic 
security, and natural disaster preparedness and response. (Jochim, May & 
Sapotichne 2011, 296) Although the research finds homeland security to be a weak 
policy regime over the long term due to lack of interest support, the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis (which the 108th Congressional hearings are situated within) 
saw a large mobilization of interest support. (Jochim & May 2011, 319; Jochim, May 
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& Sapotichne 2011, 291) Therefore, even as a weak policy regime, ideational uptake 
should still be observed due to the disruption being very recent.  
Homeland security as a policy regime is the first indicator to why relations 
between the U.S. and Mexico were disrupted because of 9/11. In the synthetic 
explanatory framework Real-Dato attributes policy stability to subsystems isolation 
from other subsystems. (Real-Dato 2009, 124) Since policy regimes incorporate 
multiple subsystems, by extension of his argument, policy regimes would also 
produce unstable policy. But why would unstable policy affect our relations with 
Mexico? Explaining this involves how the bureaucracy organizes attention following 
centralized shifts in policy. As an organizational response to 9/11, 97 percent of 
policy responses from the DHS are attributed to centralized authority focusing 
bureaucratic attention, the highest of any policy regime May studied. (May, 
Workman & Jones 2007, 529) Policy change through centralization of authority and 
informal procedures is the preferred response of the federal government when it 
involves policy that requires substantial changes because of the disruption (May, 
Workman & Jones 2007, 522) In contrast to the alternative, delegated authority and 
formal routines, centralization makes the bureaucratic response faster and more 
flexible than is typical for bureaucratic behavior. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 
522-523) There are two measures that would reveal centralized control. The first is 
a two-sample t-test focused on department heads and the change in their use of the 
word terrorism after the disruption. Second is a two-sample t-test focused on the 
same department heads, tracking their attendance at hearings before and after the 
disruption. Both tests would support bureaucratic attention being redirected by 
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centralized authority to digesting new policy demands. (May, Workman & Jones 
2007, 522-523 & 525) The final statistical piece of the puzzle brings us back to the 
original two-sample t-test that looks for a negative correlation between the words 
terrorism and Mexico. Increased use of the term terrorism in Senate hearings and 
decreased use of Mexico supports the hypothesis that centralization causes a 
bureaucratic organization to lose the ability to process issues in parallel; increased 
attention to homeland security disrupts and takes away attention from policy 
unrelated to homeland security. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 523 & 534) Relating 
the negative correlation to the bureaucracy’s loss of processing issues in parallel can 
be done by focusing the t-test on lower level department officials. If centralization 
focuses their attention on homeland security, it could disrupt attention given to 
policy regarding Mexico, shown by a significant decrease in use of the word Mexico 
by lower level department officials.  
Centralization has been discussed in some detail, but what has not been 
explained is what externalities come with centralization. Externalities are the final 
piece to relate 9/11 to a possible disruption in relations between the two nations. 
This brings up the importance of policy signals coming from hearings directed 
towards the bureaucracy. Stronger signals should result in stronger agency 
responses; centralization being one way signals are strengthened. Rose also 
concludes that signal strength is amplified through experts taking up the issue in 
hearings. (Rose 1989, 239) Experts amplify signals because they provide 
information to elected officials in hearings, influencing the amount of attention an 
issue is given. (Rose 1989, 236) Jagger examines the effect expertise has on policy, 
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information being seen as more legitimate depending on how, and by whom, it is 
presented. (Jagger 1997, 448) This organizes information hierarchically, with 
information at the apex coming from “legitimate” sources. Congressional hearings 
are a legitimate source because they occur in a very formal setting and involve 
people with high levels of authority. Signals and how information is interpreted as 
legitimate explains why centralization results in faster responses from the 
bureaucracy.  
The use of informal procedures by central authorities is often arbitrary 
compared to formal routines through delegated authority. Informal procedures that 
signal policy change to the bureaucracy do so by telling them to “do things better” or 
“do things differently”, disrupting their current policy. (May, Workman & Jones 
2007, 517) Central authority establishes these policy demands, but the agency 
decides how to respond due to the arbitrary nature of the demand. (May, Workman 
& Jones 2007, 529) In contrast, the alternative delegates policy tasks to lower levels 
of the bureaucracy using existing policy channels, which slows responses, but keeps 
policy responses stable due to clear demands. (May, Workman & Jones 2007, 522) 
Demands coming from centralization are arbitrary because the very same signals 
that direct the bureaucracy are also signals of reassurance to the general public. 
This is because centralization amplifies signals the government sends to society, 
centralized policy change coming from highly visible levels of government. (Rose 
1989, 239) Although this paper has primarily dealt with shifts in attention caused 
by 9/11 within the federal government, the public’s attention also shifts. Now 
focused on their own safety, the public expects the government to create policy that 
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will provide a blanket of protection that will keep them safe from all future attacks, 
no matter how impossible that may be. (Kettle 2003, 262-264 & 269) Therefore 
reorganization, seen in the DHS, is symbiotically important because it sends signals 
to the public about where policymakers issue attention is focused. (Kettle 2003, 
258) 
Results  
 The results from statistical tests carried out through this research provide 
evidence that supports the original hypothesis, but not enough to reject the null 
hypothesis. Expanded upon in the findings that follow, policymakers significantly 
shifted the focus of Senate hearings in the post-9/11 period. Specifically, terrorism 
became a major issue focus for most individuals speaking at hearings. Additionally, 
in the post-9/11 period terrorism became relevant in hearings where the issue 
focus would not be relevant to terrorism pre-9/11. Supporting the null hypothesis 
are tests aimed to expose changes in Mexico-related issues at senate hearings. The 
hypothesis would expect rhetoric on these issues to decrease, reflecting their 
decreased importance on the agenda due to the introduction of terrorism. 
Unfortunately this was not observed in the test results. 
The first statistically significant test that will be examined, supports 9/11 as 
a large enough focusing event to cause policy disruption. Results of the two-sample 
t-test explaining the change in the use of the term terrorism pre- and post-9/11 are 
seen in Table 1. The test compared the mean use of terrorism between the two time 
periods included in the analysis - hearings held pre-9/11  in the 106th Congress 
(1999-2000) versus those held post-9/11 in the 108th Congress (2003-2004) 
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Results in Table 1 reject the null hypothesis, which assumes that variances for the 
two groups are the same. Instead, we can conclude that the differences are 
statistically significant. Specifically, a t-statistic14 of -2.7256 with 192 degrees of 
freedom15 yield a corresponding two-tailed p-value16 of 0.007, which is less than 
0.05, allowing us to conclude that the difference of means between the use of the 
term terrorism in the 106th and 108th Congress is different from the null of 0. The 
substantive differences are notable, showing that the use of the term terrorism in 
Senate hearings increased by two-and-a-half times across the two congresses. 
Specifically, terrorism was used about 18 times per hearing in the 106th Congress 
and about 47 times per hearing in the 108th Congress. From these results we can 
deduce several important observations. First, since the data were gathered from 
Senate hearings, system engagement of the issue is noted. Furthermore, these 
results show that 9/11 refocused the attention of policymakers to terrorism 
through issue redefinition, and therefore possible conflict expansion into multiple 
subsystems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 A t-statistic in two-sample t-tests is the difference between two group means, 
calculated as the ratio of the coefficient to its standard error.  
15 Degrees of freedom are the number of values in a calculation that can vary or 
change. 
16 P-value is the probability the two groups observed are actually the same, a low p-
value showing the two are significantly different.  
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________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings 
Mean use 
of the term 
terrorism 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interaval 
106th  86 18.11628 6.174069 57.25596 5.840576 
30.39198 
108th  108 47.35185 5.416542 75.4437 31.07633 
63.62737 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 34.39175 5.416542 75.4437 23.70853 
45.07497 
Diff.  -29.23557 10.72623  -50.39196  
-8.079185 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                            t =  -2.7256 
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                   Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0035 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0070  Pr(T > t) = 0.9965 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Since the first test proved to be statistically significant, policy disruption 
associated with conflict expansion of the issue into a policy regime can be examined. 
Tests that support creation of a homeland security policy regime because of 9/11 
are the t-tests examining the change in individuals use of terrorism and ordinal 
logistic regressions examining ideational uptake of common policy goals in separate 
subsystems. The full results of each of the t-tests can be seen in Appendix B, in 
Tables B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-4. Table B-1 focuses on experts, who have been identified 
as important in directing the attention of policymakers and amplifying signals to the 
bureaucracy. Results form this t-test produce a statistically significant probability, 
with a two-tailed p-value of 0.0350, showing that the disruption explains the change 
in issue focus of experts testimony. Supporting a change in issue focus by experts 
invited to testify in Senate hearings is use of the term terrorism per hearing, 
averaging 6.7 in the 106th Congress and jumping to about 15 uses of the term in the 
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108th Congress. Table B-2 shows the change in use of terrorism by elected officials 
after the disruption event. The change in the use of the term terrorism by elected 
officials is likewise statistically significant across the two time periods with a p-
value of 0.0024. Average use of the term in hearings by elected officials more than 
doubles, from about 4 uses in the 106th Congress to 10.9 uses in the 108th Congress. 
Table B-3 looks at lower level department officials, producing a p-value of 0.0923 for 
their change in the use of terrorism. Although our p-value for this test is not below 
0.05, the results reject the tests null because the confidence interval only overlaps 
slightly, from 7.04 to 12.848. Lower level department officials use of terrorism in each 
hearing jumps from an average of about 6.5 uses in the 106th Congress to an average 
of 18.75 uses in the 108th Congress. Finally, the t-test for department heads change 
in the use of terrorism under Table B-4 does not produce statistically significant 
results (p-value of 0.2412), but still shows an increase of average use of the term: 
from .6744 to 2.4537 in the 106th and 108th Congresses respectively. The higher p-
value in Table B-4 most likely results from the sample size of department heads 
speaking at hearings being too small, shown by the comparatively high standard 
error: at .4036231 for the 106th Congress’s mean and 1.311239 for the 108th 
Congress’s mean. Although the p-value for department heads and lower level 
department officials are higher than the others, looking at all four within the context 
of policy regimes shows attention redirected towards a core idea and consensus 
among individuals at the federal level about a central policy problem. Attention 
being redirected is shown by low p-values, allowing us to concluded that difference 
in means for use of the term terrorism by individuals in the 106th and 108th 
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Congresses was the result of something; hypothesized to be the formation of a 
policy regime due to the policy disruption event 9/11. 
The preceding results demonstrate attention in U.S. Senate hearings 
experiencing a significant shift in agenda focus in the pre- and post-9/11 period. To 
what extent did this shift cause ideational uptake across subsystems because of the 
policy regimes refocusing attention to terrorism and homeland security? To put this 
simply, we would expect terrorism to be an important issue in hearings focused on 
national security, but to what extent did the issue of terrorism infiltrate hearings 
that were unrelated to terrorism before the policy disruption event? The results 
from the ordered logistic regressions meant to support the formation of a policy 
regime through ideational uptake across subsystems are presented in Tables 2 and 
3. Table 2 shows how use of terrorism changes depending on the hearings focus. 
Table 3 shows how use of terrorism changes depending on what subcommittee the 
hearing is before. Both subcommittee and hearing focus are intended to represent 
different subsystems relevant to the hearing. Explanation of the variables listed in 
each table can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 41 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 
Number of obs.=194 
LR chi2(13)=135.72 
Prob>chi2=0.0000 
Pseudo R2=.0980 
Focus Coef. Std. Err.  z P>|z| 95% Conf. 
Interval  
1. PrePost 1.833311 .3063666 5.98 0.000 1.232843    
2.433778 
Bureaucracy  .2312853 .3879053 0.60 0.551 -.5289951    
.9915657 
Specific R/C -.3037766 .3311874 -0.92 0.359 -.952892    
.3453389 
Int. Org.  -.4639047 .5147701 -0.90 0.367 -1.472836    
.5450263 
HR -.9219983 .4998035 -1.84 0.065 -1.901595    
.0575986 
Nat. Security .323663 .6007687 0.54 0.590 -.853822    
1.501148 
Trade/Econ. -1.768805 .4455311 -3.97 0.000 -2.64203   -
.8955803 
Conflict .3338296 .4367936 0.76 0.445 -.5222702    
1.189929 
Foreign 
Relations 
-.142553 .407452 -0.35 0.726 -.9411442    
.6560381 
Justice/Crime .673796 .7183981 0.94 0.348 -.7342385     
2.08183 
Terrorism 4.20097 .6599194 6.37 0.000 2.907551    
5.494388 
Aid -1.934585 5885666 -3.29 0.001 -3.088154   -
.7810153 
Middle East .2368527 .4700889 0.50 0.614 -.6845045     
1.15821 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3 
Number of obs.=194 
LR chi2(9)=91.86 
Prob>chi2=0.0000 
Pseudo R2=0.0663 
Subcommittee Coef. Std. Err. z  P>|z| 95% Conf. 
Interval 
1. PrePost 2.081327 .3167096 6.57 0.000 1.460587    
2.702066 
No Sub. .8901833 1.409702 0.63 0.528 -1.872782    
3.653148 
East Asian -1.305508 1.429392 -0.91 0.361 -4.107065    
1.496049 
West Hem. .2300759 1.518031  0.15 0.880 -2.74521    
3.205362 
Europe .4445266 1.35755 0.33 0.743 -2.216222    
3.105275 
Near East 1.025796 1.360604 0.75 0.451 -1.640938     
3.69253 
Int. Operations .5911228 1.496826 0.39 0.693 -2.342602    
3.524848 
Int. Econ. -.8567424 1.454904 -0.59 0.556 -3.708302    
1.994817 
African -3.818159 1.780187 -2.14 0.032 -7.307262   -
.3290561 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 To start, the chi-squared17 test results in Table 2 are 135.72 with a p-value of 
0.0000, meaning the ordered logistic regression as a whole is statistically significant. 
Unfortunately, statistically significant results do not show that multiple subsystems 
have the same ideational uptake, because focus of the hearing should not affect use 
of the term terrorism in a policy regime. However, these results can still support 
ideational uptake if we look into why the model as a whole is significant. 
Significance is derived from the three variables that have a p-value below 0.05: 
Trade/economics, aid, and terrorism*18. PrePost’s p-value of 0.000 is not relevant 
                                                        
17 Chi-square tests are used to compare observed data with data we would expect to 
obtain according to a specific hypothesis.  
18 The (*) is used to differentiate between the variable for the term terrorism and the 
hearing focus variable terrorism*. 
  
 43 
because it was used as a categorical variable19 in the regression to distinguish 
between use of terrorism before and after the disruption. The first explanatory point 
is that most hearings during the 108th Congress coded the focuses trade/economics 
or aid with the focus terrorism*. This is because after 9/11 the federal government 
didn’t want our economic relations with other nations, or aid given to other nations, 
supporting terrorism. The second, and fairly obvious, point is that hearings coded 
under the terrorism* focus always involved the term terrorism, explaining why all 
three have such low p-values. Combined, both points give us good reason to 
overlook the three low p-values when using this regression to support ideational 
uptake. Furthermore, this could be entirely avoided if the data was re-coded with 
this fact in mind. The most important descriptive result of this test is the p-value for 
the focus Middle East. We would expect this variable to have a p-value below 0.05 
because the U.S. often equates terrorism and the Middle East. The hypothesis 
explains this as a result of ideational uptake, which makes the issue equally relevant 
in all subsystems. Therefore, this regression does provide evidence that the 
disruption caused equal ideational uptake; seen in the other nine focuses that have 
p-values significantly over 0.05. Meaning use of the term terrorism was likely not 
effected by what focus or subsystem the hearing involved. The second ordered 
logistic regression shown in Table 3 provides stronger evidence of equal ideational 
uptake across subsystems, as eight out of nine subcommittees have p-values above 
0.05. Most important is the p-value for the Subcommittee on International Operations 
and Terrorism, which we would expect to have a p-value below 0.05 if the subsystem 
                                                        
19 A categorical variable is one that can take on a fixed number of possible values, for 
PrePost these values are “0” for the 106th Congress and “1” for the 108th Congress.  
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was not affected by policy regimes. Why the Subcommittee on African Affairs had a p-
value below 0.05 cannot be explained with my knowledge of the data. However the 
majority of focuses and subcommittees, and therefore subsystems, do not affect use 
of the term terrorism. These results, in combination with the results for individual’s 
use of terrorism, provide evidence for ideational uptake that would be witnessed 
with the formation of a policy regime.  
 Since there are significant results pointing to the formation of a policy 
regime, the test measuring effect centralization has the bureaucracy can be 
analyzed. Table B-9 shows the results a two-sample t-test tracking the change in 
department heads attendance at hearings involving terrorism due to the disruption 
and resulting policy regime. Sending the most important person in a department 
sends signals to Congress that bureaucratic attention has been refocused towards 
the issues through centralization. The test gives us a p-value of 0.1533, not 
supporting the hypothesis that centralization caused an increase in attendance by 
department heads at hearings involving terrorism. The high p-value can also be seen 
in significant overlap of the confidence interval. With confidence intervals of 0.0011 
to 0.0919 in the 106th Congress and 0.0439 to 0.1598 in the 108th Congress, 
overlapping from 0.0438 to 0.0919 and signifying the data sets are similar to each 
other. Department heads high level of importance and responsibility makes their 
appearances at committee hearings rare. Therefore a data set only including two 
congressional sessions does not seem to be enough to produce significant results for 
department heads.  
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 Although the previous test did not provide linkage between centralization 
and how the bureaucracy organizes policy attention, we can still examine the last 
statistical tests. This leads to the final two-sample t-tests tracking changes in use of 
the term Mexico, and individuals use of the same word, pre- and post-9/11. The 
results of the t-test tracking overall change in the use of Mexico can be seen in Table 
4. Results of the t-tests tracking: experts, elected officials, lower level department 
officials, and department heads change in use of Mexico are under Appendix B in 
Tables B-5, B-6, B-7, and B-8 respectively. A significant decrease of attention to 
Mexico in hearings supports the hypothesis that increased attention to the issue of 
terrorism disrupts the ability of the bureaucracy to process issues in parallel.  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 4 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings 
Mean use 
of the term 
Mexico 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th 86 13.2 6.811874 62.80237 -.3461581    
26.74616 
108th  108 17.14815 7.965569 82.78063 1.357336    
32.93896 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 15.40933 5.361703 74.48716 4.833922    
25.98473 
Diff.  -3.948148 10.82484  -25.29973    
17.40344 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                             t =  -0.3647 
Ho: diff = 0                                                    degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                           Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.3579         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7157          Pr(T > t) = 0.6421 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Table B-4 gives us a very high p-value of 0.7157, meaning this test supports the null 
hypothesis. A drop in use of the term Mexico was not observed, with average use of 
the term actually increasing from about 13 uses in the 106th Congress to about 17 
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uses in the 108th Congress. Tables B-5 through B-8; also produce statistically 
insignificant results. Only experts mean use of Mexico drops; from an average of 9.7 
to 7.3 uses in the 106th and 108th Congresses respectively. However, with a p-value 
of 0.7221 and major overlap in the confidence intervals, the observed drop has little 
statistical value. In contrast Table B-7, examining change in lower level department 
officials use of Mexico, has the lowest p-value (0.2069) and shows an increase in 
average uses per hearing for the term Mexico; from about 1.7 uses in the 106th 
Congress to about 7 uses in the 108th Congress. Taken together, these results mean 
increased attention to the issue of terrorism in hearings because of policy 
centralization did not take away the bureaucracies ability to process issues in 
parallel. Therefore, results from the data gathered supports the null hypothesis. A 
possible explanation for this could be found in the last test described in Table B-7. 
Since lower level department officials increased use of Mexico within the homeland 
security policy regime, issues centered on Mexico may have still received attention 
due to how the issues fit into the new policy regime. This would fall in line with the 
examples cited at the end of the “Literature Review” that state because of 9/11 the 
U.S. now viewed traditional relation issues with Mexico through a homeland 
security lens. Table B-10 supports this notion, the table describing results of a two-
sample t-test showing change in hearings where both terms were used pre-and 
post-9/11. The test gives us a p-value of 0.0808. Although the test is not statistically 
significant due to its p-value, it does provide some evidence that after 9/11 hearings 
in which both terms were used increased. This lends some evidence to the notion 
Mexico centered issues received the same amount of attention but only because they 
  
 47 
were redefined to mirror the new direction of national policy. However, this cannot 
overturn the null hypothesis and its only use is to provide descriptive depth for why 
attention was not taken away from issues involving Mexico.  
Conclusion 
 This paper concludes that the null hypothesis was proven; 9/11 did not 
cause a disruption in relations between the U.S. and Mexico. The results do support 
that 9/11 was a policy disruption event which was followed by the formation of a 
policy regime. However, the results do not support that a policy regime caused 
centralized control of the bureaucracy; that the policy regime caused Mexico to lose 
it place on the national agenda; or that centralization caused the bureaucracy to lose 
its ability to process policy issues in parallel. Although the results of this thesis 
support the null hypothesis, they do point towards the hypothesis being correct if a 
better data set was gathered. Comparing results from tests looking at how use of 
terrorism changed after 9/11, to results from the articles on policy regimes, policy 
disruption, how bureaucratic attention is organized, policy change after a crisis, and 
bureaucracy coordination exposes similarities. The data failed to hold up when use 
of the term Mexico and department heads attendance at hearings were tested. 
Possible remedies for this are expanding the words counted; coding for terms such 
as border security and immigration in addition to Mexico and looking for a positive, 
instead of negative, correlation. Additionally, expanding the data sets to include 
more congressional committees and years should also improve results, especially 
with respect to more data points for department heads. Therefore, explanations for 
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why progress halted on issues important to both nations, such as immigration and 
border control, is beyond the grasp of this paper.  
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Appendix A 
Description of Variables  
(In the thesis and appendix, italics identify variables.) 
 
PrePost-this variable was coded binomially, “0” for hearings in the 106th Congress 
before 9/11, and “1” for hearings in the 108th Congress after9/11.  
 
Variables for Individual Use of Each Term 
 
Elected Official-Use of either term was coded under this if spoken by policymakers 
(Senator or Member of the House). Also included were use of either term in 
written statements by elected officials staff.  
 
Department Head-Anyone from the bureaucracy who is identified in the hearings 
“Contents” section as the head of a department or independent agency. Any 
statement using either term and coming from the department/agency as a 
whole was coded under this variable. Also included were military commanders 
at the head of a military branch or in charge of a theater/region. Paul Bremer, 
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, was also coded under 
department head for the hearing he attended. The full list of departments and 
agencies attending hearings can be seen in the next section lower level 
department officials.  
 
Lower Level Department Official-Anyone from the bureaucracy who is identified in 
the hearings “Contents” section as an official lower in rank than the agency or 
department head. Additionally, anyone in the military who was not coded under 
the department head variable was coded under this variable. Departments 
included were the Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of 
Commerce, Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Department of 
Justice, Department of Treasury, and Department of Homeland Security. 
Independent agencies included were the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Small Business Administration, U.S. Agency for 
International Development, U.S. Peace Corps, U.S. Institute for Peace, and 
Broadcasting Board of Governors.  
 
Experts-The broadest variable, use of either term was coded under experts if they 
did not fall under the previous three categories and provided information or 
descriptive depth to the hearings. Ambassadors and representatives from 
companies and non-governmental organizations were coded under this 
variable. Ambassadors were considered experts because more often than not 
their hearing testimony provided expertise about a country or region being 
discussed in the hearing. Representatives from companies and non-
governmental organizations were considered experts because their testimony 
usually provided information and descriptive depth about the topic being 
discussed.  
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Variables for Hearing Focus 
(Listed in the same order as Table 2) 
 
Bureaucracy-This variable referred to any hearings that focused on bureaucratic 
organizations. Examples of this are hearings that reviewed department budgets, 
department effectiveness, or assessing changes in a department’s structure and 
leadership.  
 
Specific Country/Region-Variable that describes a country or region of the world the 
hearing focused on. Countries included under this variable in the 106th and 
108th Foreign Relations Committee Hearings are: North and South Korea, 
Russia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Mexico, India, China, Cuba, Pakistan, Columbia, 
Libya, Kosovo, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Burma, Haiti, 
Vietnam, Japan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yugoslavia. Regions included under this 
variable mentioned in the 106th and 108th Congressional Hearings are: East 
Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Balkans, and Africa.  
 
International Organization-Describes hearings focused on international 
organizations. Since the hearings coded were in front of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, International Organizations were mostly discussed in the 
context of effects on U.S. foreign relations/policy. International organizations 
included in this variable are: European Union, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and United Nations. 
 
Human Rights-Hearings were determined to have a human rights focus if the 
hearings discussed democracy, democratic rights, or violations to universal 
human rights considered a norm in the U.S. Included in this variable were 
hearings discussing proper treatment of children, whether it be cases of child 
abduction or adopting a child from poor conditions to improve quality of life. 
Also included was the treatment of Islam, or religious freedom, in U.S. foreign 
policy.  
 
National Security-Any hearing examining issues that were considered by individuals 
at the hearing to be threats to the security of the U.S. or its citizens. This 
variable includes assessing the safety of Peace Corps officers overseas, embassy 
security, and revolutions/unstable governments that could threaten U.S. 
interests. Issues of terrorism were coded under terrorism* and not national 
security.  
 
Trade/Economics-Hearings that reviewed issues involving trade between nations or 
the economy at some capacity. In terms of trade between nations, NAFTA and 
hearings that reviewed tax treaties or trade conflict were prominent. Hearings 
focused on agriculture were determined to be relevant to the economy. Energy 
issues were also considered economic issues along with climate change and 
environmental protection.   
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Conflict-Hearings coded under this variable involved issues of war and peace. 
Expanding this, conflict could mean rebellions in a country leading to violence, 
peace negations aimed to end violence, countries threatening conflict, nuclear 
weapons, and nonproliferation.   
 
Foreign Relations-Defined as any hearings where issue focus was U.S. foreign policy 
towards other nations or foreign policy directed towards the U.S. Coded under 
this variable were also hearings focused on U.S. diplomacy, sanctions against 
nations, and treaties. A hearing focused on treaties was not included under this 
variable if the treaty applied to the conflict or trade/economics variable  
 
Justice/Crime-Issues that examine criminal activity and justice or rule of law. 
Included in this variable are hearings focused on international drug cartels, 
corrupt governments and organizations, and law enforcement agencies. A 
hearing on the International Criminal Court in the 106th Congress, although 
technically fitting under the definition for international organizations, was 
included under this variable as it was thought to be more relevant to 
justice/crime. 
 
Terrorism*-This variable was defined as any hearing focused on the threat of 
terrorism; terrorism defined by the individuals at the hearing and not myself to 
avoid debates of terrorist vs. freedom fighter. A hearing that fit this variable and 
national security was coded as terrorism*. Hearings focused on the Taliban were 
also coded as terrorism* focused. The asterisk (*) is used to note the difference 
between the variable terrorism* and the term terrorism. 
 
Aid-Any instance where the hearing focused on assisting other countries in their 
development or providing emergency aid. Included in this variable were 
hearings on diseases, disaster relief, poverty, and hunger. Also included were 
hearings on developing Afghanistan during U.S. occupation.  
 
Middle East-This variable was used to specify hearings focused on the region, and 
was not coded under Specific Country/Region if coded as Middle East or a 
country within it. Countries included in this variable are: Iraq, Israel, Syria, Iran, 
and Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan is not part of the region defined by 
geographers as the Middle East, it was included in this variable because policy 
involving the country is often developed within a Middle Eastern framework.  
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Appendix B 
Statistical Test Results 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-1-two-sample t-test exploring change in experts use of the term terrorism 
after 9/11. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings 
Mean use of 
the term 
terrorism 
Std. Err.  Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 6.674419 2.211365 20.50735 2.277633     
11.0712 
108th  108 15.2037 3.121619 32.44082 9.015458    
21.39195 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 11.42268 2.01377 28.04856 7.450859     
15.3945 
Diff.   -8.529285 4.017347  -16.45309   
-.6054836 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                              t =  -2.1231 
Ho: diff = 0                                                    degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0175         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0350          Pr(T > t) = 0.9825 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-2- two-sample t-test exploring change in elected officials use of the term 
terrorism after 9/11. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings  
Mean use of 
the term 
terrorism 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 4.081395 1.620425 15.0272 .8595564    
7.303234 
108th  108 10.94444 1.520304 15.79946 7.930619    
13.95827 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 7.902062 1.134122 15.79649 5.665197    
10.13893 
Diff.   -6.863049 2.234678  -11.27072   
-2.455379 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                               t =  -3.0712 
Ho: diff = 0                                                    degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0012         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0024          Pr(T > t) = 0.9988 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
  
 53 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-3- two-sample t-test exploring change in lower level department officials 
use of the term terrorism after 9/11. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings  
Mean use of 
the term 
terrorism 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 6.581395 3.151812 29.2287 .3147494    
12.84804 
108th  108 18.75 5.905072 61.36731 7.043884    
30.45612 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 13.35567 3.590395 50.00842 6.27422    
20.43712 
Diff.   -12.1686 7.192797  -26.35565    
2.018444 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                              t =  -1.6918 
Ho: diff = 0                                                   degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                      Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0462         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0923          Pr(T > t) = 0.9538 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-4- two-sample t-test exploring change in department heads use of the term 
terrorism after 9/11. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings  
Mean use of 
the term 
terrorism 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 .6744186 .4036231 3.743046 -.1280922    
1.476929 
108th  108 2.453704 1.311239 13.62679 -.1456738    
5.053081 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 1.664948 .7526678 10.48345 .180438    
3.149459 
Diff.   -1.779285 1.513613  -4.764729    
1.206159 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                             t =  -1.1755 
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.1206         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2412          Pr(T > t) = 0.8794 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-5- two-sample t-test exploring change in experts use of the term Mexico 
after 9/11. 
Congress  Number of 
Senate 
Hearings  
Mean use of 
the term 
Mexico 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 9.697674 6.087373 56.45197 -2.405653      
21.801 
108th  108 7.314815 3.487793 36.24621 .4006714    
14.22896 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 8.371134 3.316082 46.18768 1.83072    
14.91155 
Diff.   2.38286 6.690376  -10.81322    
15.57893 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                               t =   0.3562 
Ho: diff = 0                                                    degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                           Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.6389         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7221          Pr(T > t) = 0.3611 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-6- two-sample t-test exploring change in elected officials use of the term 
Mexico after 9/11. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings   
Mean use of 
the term 
Mexico 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 1.337209 .4573792 4.24156 .4278169    
2.246602 
108th  108 2.351852 1.240702 12.89375 -.1076951    
4.811399 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 1.902062 .7192059 10.01738 .4835494    
3.320574 
Diff.   -1.014643 1.449668  -3.873963    
1.844678 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                            t =  -0.6999 
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                           Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.2424         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.4848          Pr(T > t) = 0.7576 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-7- two-sample t-test exploring change in lower level department officials 
use of the term Mexico after 9/11. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings  
Mean use of 
the term 
Mexico 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 1.744186 .9626664 8.927401 -.1698528    
3.658225 
108th  108 7.111111 3.700947 38.46137 -.2255855    
14.44781 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 4.731959 2.108357 29.36602 .573579    
8.890338 
Diff.   -5.366925 4.237465  -13.72489    
2.991037 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                               t =  -1.2665 
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.1034         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.2069          Pr(T > t) = 0.8966 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-8- two-sample t-test exploring change in department heads use of the term 
Mexico after 9/11. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings   
Mean use of 
the term 
Mexico 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 .2674419 .2559414 2.373503 -.2414382    
.7763219 
108th  108 .3703704 .2061669 2.142549 -.0383314    
.7790721 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 .3247423 .1610006 2.242479 .0071957    
.6422888 
Diff.   -.1029285 .3248498  -.7436612    
.5378041 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                              t =  -0.3168 
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.3759         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7517          Pr(T > t) = 0.6241 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-9- two-sample t-test comparing changes in hearing attendance by 
department heads at hearings involving terrorism. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings  
Mean 
attendance 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 .0465116 .0228417 .2118255 .0010961    
.0919271 
108th  108 .1018519 .0292393 .3038634 .0438884    
.1598153 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 .0773196 .0192261 .2677889 .0393993    
.1152399 
Diff.   -.0553402 .0385965  -.1314678    
.0207873 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                             t =  -1.4338 
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                     Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0766         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1533          Pr(T > t) =0.9234 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table B-10- two-sample t-test comparing change in hearings where both terrorism 
and Mexico are used. 
Congress Number of 
Senate 
Hearings  
Mean 
hearings 
with both 
terms 
Std. Err. Std. Dev.  95% Conf. 
Interval 
106th  86 .244186 .046597 .4321233 .1515386    
.3368335 
108th  108 .3611111 .0464345 .482562 .26906    
.4531622 
Combined 
(106th&108th) 
194 .3092784 .0332696 .463392 .2436597     
.374897 
Diff.   -.1169251 .0666131  -.2483124    
.0144623 
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                              t =  -1.7553 
Ho: diff = 0                                         degrees of freedom =      192 
 
Ha: diff < 0                       Ha: diff != 0                            Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0404         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0808          Pr(T > t) = 0.9596 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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